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Rik Peels1* , Jeroen de Ridder1, Tamarinde Haven1 and Lex Bouter1,2Abstract
Both scientists and society at large have rightfully become increasingly concerned about research integrity in recent
decades. In response, codes of conduct for research have been developed and elaborated. We show that these
codes contain substantial pluralism. First, there is metaphysical pluralism in that codes include values, norms, and
virtues. Second, there is axiological pluralism, because there are different categories of values, norms, and virtues:
epistemic, moral, professional, social, and legal. Within and between these different categories, norms can be
incommensurable or incompatible. Codes of conduct typically do not specify how to handle situations where
different norms pull in different directions. We review some attempts to develop an ordering of different sorts of
norm violations based on a common measure for their seriousness. We argue that they all fail to give adequate
guidance for resolving cases of incommensurable and conflicting norms. We conclude that value pluralism is
inherent to codes of conduct in research integrity. The application of codes needs careful reasoning and judgment
together with an intellectually humble attitude that acknowledges the inevitability of value pluralism.
Keywords: Code of conduct, Epistemology, Ethics, Pluralism, Principle, Value, VirtueIntroduction
This paper starts the project of developing an axio-
logical framework for classifying and comparing the
elements of codes of conduct for research integrity.
We will investigate the contents of a set of codes sys-
tematically, in order to bring more theoretical clarity
to them and to develop a framework in which the no-
tion of research integrity can be articulated with
greater conceptual clarity and precision. We will see
that there is irreducible value pluralism in research
integrity: there is a variety of different kinds of values
underlying codes of conduct that cannot be reduced
to each other and that give rise to a plurality of vir-
tues and norms, some of which are either incommen-
surable or in conflict with each other. Thus, when we
refer to “value pluralism,” we have in mind the plur-
ality of values that underlies research codes, but also
mean to include the plurality of norms and virtues
that this plurality of values gives rise to (below, we
will say more about how values relate to norms and
virtues).© The Author(s). 2019 Open Access This artic
International License (http://creativecommons
reproduction in any medium, provided you g
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/ze
* Correspondence: mail@rikpeels.nl
1Philosophy Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Full list of author information is available at the end of the articleWe will not attempt to give an all-encompassing
characterization of research integrity here—that would
be overly ambitious—but we will specify several ingredi-
ents that any future satisfactory characterization should
include. Our study is primarily conceptual and not quali-
tative empirical.1 Hence, we refer to the codes we se-
lected to illustrate our conceptual points. We do not aim
to defend any particular set of values or norms that can
provide a normative foundation for existing codes of re-
search integrity.2 Rather, we argue that any such founda-
tion must be pluralistic because value pluralism in
research integrity is inevitable.
With an eye to representativeness, we have selected
codes of conduct on the basis of three criteria: geograph-
ical diversity, age (the more recent, the better), and inde-
pendent origins. Our sample includes the following: the
2017 European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity,
also referred to as the “ALLEA code” (for Europe) [1,
37]; the 2011 Directives on Research Integrity Brazil by
the Brazilian Council for Scientific and Technological
Development [9], as well as the 2012 complementary
code of conduct FAPESP—Code of Good Scientific Prac-
tice by the Sao Paulo Research Foundation (for South-
America) [48]; the 2014 Guidelines for Responding tole is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
ro/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
1For an example of that, see [41].
2See [12, 40, 44, 45] for this.
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Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan (for
Asia) [23]; the 2016 Australian Code for the responsible
Conduct of Research by Universities Australia, Australian
Government, National Health and Medical Research
Council, and Australian Research Council (for Australia)
[3]; the 2004 Guidelines for Researchers and Ethics Re-
view of Committees in Zimbabwe by the Medical Re-
search Council of Zimbabwe (for Africa) [22]; and
finally, the 2013 Code of Conduct by the National Re-
search Council Canada (for North-America) [36].3
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First,
we provide some background to motivate the project of
the paper (the “Background” section). We then intro-
duce distinctions between several kinds of things one
finds in codes of conduct on research integrity, espe-
cially values, virtues, and norms (the “Metaphysical plur-
alism: values, norms, and virtues” section). Subsequently,
we show that norms can be classified in at least five dif-
ferent categories: epistemic, moral, professional, social,
and legal (the “Axiological pluralism: five categories of
normativity” section). After that, we show two ways in
which value pluralism manifests itself in codes of
conduct: incommensurable norms (the “Axiological
pluralism 1: Incommensurable norms from different
categories” section) and incompatible norms (the “Axio-
logical pluralism 2: Conflicting norms from the same
category” section). In doing so, we shall largely focus on
epistemic and moral norms. We then consider three at-
tempts to overcome incommensurability and incompati-
bility and argue that in spite of their use, they do not
solve the problem of value pluralism in research integ-
rity. Finally, we draw a few conclusions and formulate
recommendations for future work on this (the “Over-
coming pluralism?” section).Background
Both scientists and society at large have rightfully be-
come increasingly concerned about research integrity in
recent decades. Among the reasons for this are various
high-profile cases of research misconduct, the apparently
high prevalence of questionable research practices in
some academic disciplines, and growing concerns over
sloppy science and research waste [8, 10, 17, 24, 32, 33].3We have intentionally not included the Singapore Statement on
Research Integrity (https://www.wcrif.org/guidance/singapore-
statement). This is because it is not itself a code of conduct but
(successfully) serves as an international framework in which national
codes can be developed. It does not specify standards or norms, but
only contains more abstract values and virtues. We aim at the level of
national codes that have the ambition to cover all disciplinary fields.
There are many more detailed codes for specific disciplines. However,
an analysis of value pluralism in these disciplinary codes falls outside
the scope of our article.Part of the response to these concerns has been the
development and further elaboration of codes of conduct
for research integrity. These codes provide core values,
rules, and principles that seek to codify what it is to con-
duct scientific research responsibly and to avoid fraud
and questionable research practices. They are typically
drawn up in close collaboration with scientists, by scien-
tific institutions such as disciplinary associations, offices
for research integrity, funding agencies, and national and
international academies of science. In Europe alone,
there are more than 40 national codes of conduct for re-
search integrity [19, 20].
These codes of conduct are a mixed bag of mixed
bags, in the following sense. First, there are many
codes with significantly different contents. Moreover,
the terminology and classification systems used across
different codes vary: something that is described as a
value in one code might show up as a principle or a
responsibility in another. Second, even single codes
typically use a wide variety of terms: a cursory glance
reveals that some are organized around core “values,”
others contain long lists of “rules” or “principles,”
sometimes accompanied by more concrete “applica-
tions,” yet others talk about “duties” or “responsibil-
ities,” and we find “best practices” as well as various
combinations of these items.
All by itself, this does not show that there is any-
thing wrong with current approaches to research in-
tegrity. Just as there are many roads to Rome, there
may be many roads to capturing what responsible
conduct of research is. Nonetheless, it would be help-
ful if there were a more encompassing systematic axi-
ological framework that identifies and classifies the
elements of research integrity and responsible conduct
of research. There are several reasons for this. First,
the absence of such a framework might give the false
impression that the notions of research integrity and
responsible conduct of research lack clear meaning
and that their definitions are up for grabs. Second, a
framework can provide conceptual clarity and sys-
tematicity that can be helpful in carrying out future
research on research integrity, but also in disseminat-
ing, implementing, and communicating these codes.
Third, a general framework can bring out overlap or
outright duplication in codes of conduct, thus avoid-
ing unnecessary complications and confusions. Fourth,
it might identify blind spots in codes: values, norms,
academic misbehaviors, or questionable research prac-
tices that may have been overlooked. Fifth, a frame-
work can function as a means for recognizing and
navigating trade-offs in responsible conduct of re-
search transparently. Philosophers of science have
long recognized that the values and norms that
operate in science can pull in different directions [15,
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more systematic and fine-grained comparison and as-
sessment of the gravity of questionable research prac-
tices and misconduct. Such comparisons and
assessments are important for (i) identifying and de-
veloping the most promising and effective interven-
tions for improving scientific practice, and (ii)
avoiding arbitrariness and capriciousness in sanction-
ing breaches of integrity. Breaches are typically evalu-
ated on the basis of codes of conduct that are
specific to the institute, funding agency, discipline, or
country of the case. However, without a general
framework to compare and weigh different breaches
of misconduct, organizations run the risk of applying
sanctions more or less arbitrarily. To be clear, a
framework by itself is not enough to make the re-
quired comparisons and assessments, but it can help
to see more clearly what values, norms, etc. should
go into them.Metaphysical pluralism: values, norms, and
virtues
Before we look at actual codes of conduct in more detail,
it is helpful first to ask a more general question: what
sorts of things are in these codes? As noted above, a
quick glance reveals a significant variety in the sorts of
things that codes of conduct are organized around and
describe: (i) values, (ii) norms, rules, standards, or princi-
ples (we will use these terms synonymously), (iii) virtues,
(iv) responsibilities or duties, and (v) good (or bad) prac-
tices. Let us first get a better grip on what these things
are.5In the actual text of the code, these things are designated asValues
Values are universals, more specifically good-making
properties that actions, events, objects, or persons can
have. They are what makes something have worth and
be desirable.4 For example, to say that truth is a value is
to say that it is desirable for claims, theories, or other
truth-apt items to be true or, more precisely, that it is
desirable for people to believe and say things that are
true. Even though most codes do not use the term
“value” explicitly, we find various examples of values in
them. For instance:4This is a very rough take on the nature of values. The nature of
values is central to the philosophical subdiscipline of value theory or
axiology. Its central questions include the following: What is the exact
nature of values? Are there objective values or are all values subjective,
dependent on people’s preferences? What sort of values are there? Are
some things intrinsically valuable, in and of themselves, or is all value
instrumental? [34, 43] offer helpful overviews of key issues and contain











 Impact, accountability, leadership, integrity, and
collaboration (Canada Policy, p. 3);
 Moral leadership, honesty, integrity, rigor,
transparency, fairness, respect, recognition, and
accountability (Australian Code, pp. 1–2);
 Knowledge and trust (Guidelines from Japan,
pp. 1–2);
 Intellectual honesty, objectivity and impartiality,
truthfulness, and fairness and responsibility
(FAPESP, Brazil, p. 21);5
 Respect for autonomy and protection of persons
with impaired or diminished autonomy (Guidelines
from Zimbabwe, p. 3).Norms
Norms (principles, rules, directives, standards, or guide-
lines) are statements that describe or prescribe desirable,
required, or optimal behavior for researchers or that de-
scribe, proscribe, or discourage undesirable, forbidden,
or suboptimal behavior. Norms say how people ought,
and ought not, to conduct themselves. There are norms
at different levels of generality and abstraction, ranging
from the very general (“do the right thing”) to the spe-
cific and concrete (“use Chicago style in preparing your
manuscript for this journal”).6 They can also differ in
their range of application. Some norms apply to every-
one, others only to specific subgroups or individuals,
such as, in our case, scientists and scholars. The bulk of
codes of research integrity consists of norms. Here are a
few examples of general norms that apply to all aca-
demic disciplines:
 Use the unpublished work of other researchers only
with permission and due acknowledgement and use
published work of other researchers with due
acknowledgement (Canada Policy, p. 4);
 Researchers must precisely and completely record the
data and information collected, the procedures utilized,
and any partial results obtained during the course of a
research study (Directives from Brazil, p. 24).
Some norms only apply to some academic fields be-
cause of their content. For instance, rules about datandamental principles,” but since they do not formulate rules or
idelines for behavior—which we take to be the hallmark of
inciples and rules—but describe fairly abstract qualities of actions
d practices, we have included them under “values” here.
ometimes, a distinction is drawn between principles, which are taken
more abstract, and guidelines, which translate abstract principles
to more concrete rules. The distinction between more abstract and
ore concrete norms is obviously real, even though there is no sharp
undary between the two. But since this usage is not universal, we
ill continue to speak of abstract and concrete norms.
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no empirical data, such as mathematics or philosophy:
 Researchers, research institutions, and organizations
ensure appropriate stewardship and curation of all
data and research materials, including unpublished
ones, with secure preservation for a reasonable
period (ALLEA, p. 6).
Obviously, norms such as the following are only rele-
vant to fields that do experiments involving animals:
 Ensure replacement, reduction, and refinement
will be considered at all stages of research
involving animals. Act to minimize the impacts
on animals used in research and in so doing
support the welfare and wellbeing of these
animals (Australian Code, p. 4);
 Appropriate caution must be exercised in the
conduct of research which may affect the
environment, and the welfare of animals used for
research must be respected (Guidelines from
Zimbabwe, p. 18).
Various codes also list examples of violations of aca-
demic integrity: research misconduct and unacceptable
practices (Directives from Brazil, pp. 31–32). Although
these are not explicitly formulated as norms, they can be
straightforwardly interpreted as such: avoid misconduct
and do not engage in other unacceptable practices. Mis-
conduct is traditionally defined as fabrication, falsifica-
tion, and plagiarism (Directives from Brazil, p. 31).
Another example of an unacceptable practice is:
 Manipulating authorship or denigrating the role of
other researchers in publications (ALLEA, p. 8).
Virtues
Virtues are “qualities that make a person excellent” ([5],
p. 2), that is, character traits or behavioral dispositions
that individuals can have and that have positive value.
They can be subdivided in moral and intellectual virtues.
Moral virtues are constitutive of and conducive to a
morally upstanding and flourishing life (cf. [26]), while
“intellectual virtues are characteristics that promote in-
tellectual flourishing, or which make for an excellent
cognizer” ([49]; cf. also [14]).7
These broad characterizations are fleshed out in differ-
ent ways by different virtue theorists. Some maintain
that intellectual virtues are mere reliable cognitive7The exact relation between these two kinds of virtues is a subject of
philosophical debate among virtue theorists. For our purposes here, it
suffices if we can draw a prima facie plausible distinction between
them.processes [21, 46, 47], while others construe intellectual
virtues more robustly, as involving proper affective and
volitional states, in addition to cognitive aspects [4, 42,
50]. We can ignore these differences here and work with
a broad inclusive notion of virtue that covers both the
“thin” and “thick” construals of virtue.
Although no code of conduct included here mentions
virtues explicitly, they do contain many items that are
most naturally understood as character traits or good-
making qualities of individuals or groups. Here are some
examples:
 Reliability, honesty, respect, and accountability
(ALLEA, p. 4);8
 Intellectual honesty, objectivity and impartiality,
truthfulness, and fairness and responsibility
(Directives from Brazil, p. 21).
Note that some items on this list, such as reliability
and honesty, can be understood generally as a value—
some good-making property that actions, studies, people,
events, or instruments can have—or as a virtue, that is,
as a moral or intellectual character trait of researchers
or perhaps even teams and organizations. This explains
why several items on the above list can also be found
under “values.” In fact, it follows from the above
characterization of values that virtues are, properly
speaking, a subset of values. They are, after all, features
that make something (in this case, persons) good. The
reason to discuss them separately is that they are typic-
ally singled out as an especially relevant class of values,
since responsible conduct of research directly concerns
the behavior and dispositions of researchers.Responsibilities, duties, and practices
Codes further contain responsibilities, duties, and prac-
tices. Responsibilities relate persons to actions or their
consequences and make normative appraisal of the per-
son in question possible. If it is your responsibility to
enter data carefully or to see to it that it gets done care-
fully, you are not doing a good job if you do not spend
any time in the lab. Duties are similar; they also relate
agents to actions or their consequences, by stipulating
that there are actions that an agent is obligated or re-
quired to do, or consequences she ought to bring about.
The important thing to see is that responsibility and
duty talk can easily be translated into norms talk. If it is
your responsibility to do X, then the norm “do X”8ALLEA actually refers to these items as “principles.” Strictly speaking,
this is a misnomer, as these terms are more naturally understood as
designating personal qualities of a researcher or a research community.
Cf. also note 6 above.
10Attentive readers might wonder whether virtues, values, and norms
all come in the five categories identified here. As this section will
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down to a rule that you ought to avoid Y.
Some codes of conduct further describe good, question-
able, or unacceptable research practices. We can think of
these as ways of conducting, organizing, and evaluating re-
search that are desirable, undesirable, or even precluded, be-
cause they exemplify a good or ideal way of doing things, or
rather violate it. Talk about practices, too, can easily be trans-
lated into talk about norms. We will, therefore, not treat re-
sponsibilities, duties, and practices separately but take them
into account in our discussion on norms.
This leaves us with three kinds of items that make up the
bulk of codes for responsible conduct of research: values,
norms, and virtues. These things are generally thought to be
metaphysically different.9 Appreciating this matters for rea-
sons of analytical clarity, but arguably also has practical im-
port. First, in so far as codes emphasize norms, their
implementation and use might promote rule-following and
communication about procedures, protocols, etc. An em-
phasis on virtues, on the other hand, more easily translates
to things like mentoring, character-building, and interven-
tions to create a culture of research integrity. Second, failing
to appreciate the differences between values, norms, and vir-
tues can lead to confusion in assessing behavior in the light
of a code of conduct. For example, one cannot straightfor-
wardly compare an abstract value such as truth with a spe-
cific intellectual character trait, such as intellectual
thoroughness. Failure to appreciate the difference between
virtues and norms might lead one miss the insights that,
sometimes, following all the norms to the letter can still fall
short of intellectually virtuous behavior and that virtue can
sometimes requires one to flout a norm.
Saying that values, norms, and virtues are metaphysically
distinct is not to deny that they bear relations to each other.
Values are typically fairly abstract qualities. Norms give
concrete prescriptions for how we can realize or promote
values. For example, if honesty is a value, then researchers
should refrain from overstating their conclusions and from
downplaying the study limitations. We can thus say that
norms derive from one or more values and that values give
rise to norms. Virtues, in turn, are also conducive to the
realization of more abstract values. If researchers possess
virtues such as carefulness, thoroughness, and open-
mindedness, this will be conducive to the acquisition of
knowledge. Virtues are usually also fairly abstract and can
be made concrete by specifying characteristic rules that fol-
low from them. Although acting virtuously will typically
mean that researchers follow rules for responsible conduct,
it might occasionally mean that they not follow them to the
letter, because possessing virtues also involves sensitivity to9Although, as we said above, when values are characterized broadly,
virtues are a subset of them. Strictly speaking, then, we would have
only two kinds of things on our list here.the limits of rules, to the different ways in which they might
be interpreted, and to their spirit rather than their letter. So
the first kind of pluralism in scientific codes of conduct is
of a metaphysical sort: codes describe different kinds of
things.
In what follows, we shall focus on norms. This is be-
cause they are more concrete: they prescribe or prohibit
specific behavior. As a result of that, potential conflict,
tension, or incommensurability between them is more
perspicuous than with the more abstract and vague cat-
egories of values and virtues. This makes norms highly
suited to bring out a second kind of pluralism in codes
of conduct, stemming from different categories of values,
virtues, and norms.Axiological pluralism: five categories of
normativity
The second form of pluralism in codes of conduct is axio-
logical. It follows from the fact that there are different cat-
egories of norms. This is because there are different
categories of normativity and normative appraisal: epi-
stemic, moral, professional, social, and legal. “Do not lie” is
a moral norm, but not all lying is prohibited by a legal
norm and in some situations social norms in fact call for
lying. There is overlap between these normative categories.
Legal norms typically align with and codify moral and social
norms. Sometimes, professional norms are formally
encoded in legal norms. Since scientific research is in the
business of truth-finding, many professional norms for re-
search are indirectly or directly related to epistemic norms.
Moreover, specific behaviors and practices may be desirable
or undesirable from different normative perspectives. Good
mentoring, for example, is desirable from a moral, social,
and professional perspective. This sometimes makes it diffi-
cult to peg norms into a single category. Nonetheless, other
rules clearly do belong in one category: it is a professional
norm, for instance, to use an accepted bibliographical style
for referring to literature, but doing so has little or no rele-
vance from other normative perspectives. Codes of conduct
contain items from all five categories, as we will now
show.10
(1) Epistemic norms have to do with what is desirable
or required from the perspective of acquiring and
maintaining true beliefs, knowledge, and
understanding, and avoiding false beliefs, ignorance,
and unsupported or unjustified belief. Since theshow, we think this is certainly the case for values and norms, but less
clearly so for virtues. While philosophers commonly distinguish
between moral and epistemic (or intellectual) virtues and sometimes
talk about professional virtues, we are not aware of any work on social
or legal virtues.
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find many examples of epistemic norms in codes of
conduct. Do not misinterpret data to obtain desired results,
where this includes inappropriate use of statistical
methods (Canada Policy, p. 6);
 Researchers report their results in a way that is
compatible with the standards of the discipline and,
where applicable, can be verified and reproduced.
(ALLEA, p. 7, emphasis added).(2) Moral norms are norms that pertain to the
treatment and wellbeing of individuals, animals, and
groups, as well as the flourishing of nature (flora
and fauna). Examples are as follows: Fellow researchers will be treated fairly and with
respect (Australian Code, p. 2);
 Respect for animals must underpin all decisions and
actions related to the care and use of animals in
research (Australian Code, p. 2).(3) Professional norms are norms the violation of which
does not necessarily lead to epistemic or moral harms,
but to behavior that is nonetheless unacceptable by
the standards of the profession. Scholarly and scientific
research has its implicit and explicit conventions and
rules that regulate what it is to do one’s work well.
Examples include the following: Establish good governance and management
practices for responsible research conduct
(Australian Code, p. 3);
 The inclusion of authors in the manuscript should be
discussed before starting the collaboration and should
be based on established guidelines, such as those from
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors
(Directives from Brazil, p. 2);
 Any researcher that publishes a scientific work that
is identical or substantially similar to a work already
published should clearly and prominently cite the
first publication in the text of the work (Directives
from Brazil, p. 23).
 All partners in research collaborations take
responsibility for the integrity of the research
(ALLEA, p. 6).
It is not always easy to distinguish professional
norms from norms in other categories. First, the goal
of science is the pursuit of truth and knowledge.
Hence, many professional norms of science bear dir-
ectly or indirectly on that goal and are therefore also
partly epistemic. Norms like “provide accurate sourcereferences” or “keep the bibliography at a reasonable
size” make it easier to assess the support for claims
presented in an article. Arguably, this is conducive to
knowledge production. Second, as professional norms
become more widely accepted and entrenched, it be-
comes morally unacceptable to violate them. It may
have been acceptable at one time to “mentor” Ph.D.
students by throwing them in at the deep end only to
wait if they would resurface again, but nowadays this
is—or should be—morally unacceptable. Professional
norms for good mentorship have become more
demanding.
(4) Social norms are norms that are relevant to the
wellbeing and flourishing of the society in which
the research is carried out. Here are examples: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and
communities will be consulted and involved in
decisions about research and will be informed
about research outcomes and benefits (Australian
Code, p. 2);
 Researchers have due regard for the health, safety,
and welfare of the community, of collaborators, and
of others connected with their research (ALLEA,
p.7).(5) Legal norms are norms that can be found in
official law or jurisprudence. Obviously, legal
norms are often inspired by what legislative
authorities take to be epistemic, moral, social,
and professional norms. Yet, there may be
reasons to put in place legislation even if there
are corresponding epistemic, moral, social, and
professional norms—say, for the sake of
deterrence. Here are examples: Research will comply with all relevant legislation
and governmental and institutional policies and
guidelines (Australian Code, p. 2);
 One of the responsibilities of researchers is
observing laws and relevant regulations in
conducting research (Guidelines form Japan, p. 29);
 Whether or not, in the country in which the
prospective subject is invited to participate in
research, the right to compensation is legally
guaranteed (Directives from Zimbabwe, p. 23);
 Under the Access to Information and Privacy
(ATIP) Acts, any personal information or
written information on the conduct and
conclusions of the research integrity process can
only be shared within the limits of the
legislation or if the persons involved agree
(Canada Policy, p. 11).
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aspects of research integrity.Axiological pluralism 1: Incommensurable norms
from different categories
We have identified two sorts of pluralism in codes of
conduct for research integrity: metaphysical and axiolog-
ical. That is to say, we have seen that codes of conduct
contain metaphysically different things: values, norms,
and virtues. While there are relations between them,
they are not the same. We have also seen that there are
axiologically different categories of norms: epistemic,
moral, professional, social, and legal.
In this and the next two sections, we argue that this
pluralism is inevitable, and not a contingent feature of
the way codes of conduct are currently organized. Any
viable code of conduct for research integrity will display
substantial pluralism. In this section, we discuss two ex-
amples of incommensurability between norms from dif-
ferent categories. When norms are incommensurable,
they cannot be compared to one another or put in one
single ordering because they do not map onto a single
common scale.11 In the next section, we will give exam-
ples of conflicting (and potentially incommensurable)
norms within the same categories. Conflicts between
norms show the need for trade-offs in interpreting what
research integrity means in situations where two or
more conflicting norms apply.12Example 1
The ALLEA code contains a variety of epistemic norms
for openness and transparency that are aimed at wide
distribution of data and knowledge. Here are three
instances:
 Researchers, research institutions, and organizations
ensure access to data is as open as possible, as
closed as necessary, and where appropriate in line
with the FAIR Principles (Findable, Accessible,
Interoperable, and Re-usable) for data management
(p. 6);
 Researchers, research institutions, and organizations
acknowledge data as legitimate and citable products
of research (p. 6);11See [7, 25] for a detailed treatment of incommensurability and its
relevance for practical reasoning and ethics.
12These are two ways in which value pluralism is inevitable. This is not
to deny that there might be further ways in which value pluralism is
necessary. Moffatt [35] argues that there may be multiple but equally
valid ways of knowing and multiple but equally valid accounts of
scientific authorship. While this does not quite establish that there are
irreducibly different values behind these different ways of knowing and
accounts of authorship, Moffatt’s claims might be seen as congenial to
the sort of pluralism we defend here. Authors ensure that their work is made available to
colleagues in a timely, open, transparent, and
accurate manner, unless otherwise agreed, and are
honest in their communication to the general public
and in traditional and social media (p. 7).
These epistemic norms can point in another direction
than professional norms about joint work and agree-
ments with other (sometimes commercial) parties about
(temporary) secrecy or privacy, as they are mentioned in
sections 2.3 and 2.6 of ALLEA:
 Researchers publish results and interpretations of
research in an open, honest, transparent, and
accurate manner, and respect confidentiality of
data or findings when legitimately required to do
so (p. 6).
 All partners formally agree at the start of their
collaboration on expectations and standards
concerning research integrity, on the laws and
regulations that will apply, on protection of the
intellectual property of collaborators, and on
procedures for handling conflicts and possible cases
of misconduct (pp. 6–7);
From a purely epistemic perspective, disclosing
everything, complete openness, and full transparency
would be optimal, as it would produce more and
more widely shared knowledge. From a purely profes-
sional (and legal) perspective, on the other hand, it is
arguably paramount to respect agreements, mutual
expectations, and contracts, no matter how much
non-disclosure and secrecy they entail. So epistemic
norms and professional norms pull in different direc-
tions here. It should be noted that the formulations
of the specific norms above already have qualifications
built into them to navigate tensions between openness
and closedness, between sharing and not-sharing: e.g.,
“as open as possible,” “as closed as necessary,” and
work is to be made available “unless otherwise
agreed.” This reinforces our earlier point that the
concrete norms in codes of conduct often cannot be
placed in one of our five categories exclusively.
The important point for now is that it is difficult to
adjudicate the tension between openness and non-
disclosure because it derives from two incommensurable
values underlying these norms. It is unclear how one can
compare the epistemic value of openness with the pro-
fessional/legal value of honoring agreements and con-
tracts. Or, better, it seems that they cannot be compared
at all. To see this, ask yourself how one might go about
making a principled argument that, say, openness is
more important than respecting a non-sharing clause in
an agreement with a sponsor. It is not as if we have a
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openness and that of secrecy, nor is there a more general
value or perspective under which both might be
subsumed.13
Hence, it is unclear that there is a uniquely correct an-
swer as to which of the two should prevail in a given
scenario, because the relevant epistemic and profes-
sional/legal values behind the norms do not map onto
one common scale. Of course, one can decide to let one
or the other prevail in cases of conflict, but that does
not remove the incommensurability. Scholars in research
integrity ought to be aware of such incommensurability,
since it enables us to appreciate that others might make
different choices that may well be equally reasonable. In-
commensurable norms can lead to different reasonable
verdicts in particular cases.Example 2
Epistemic norms that aim at maximizing the amount of
true beliefs produced by pursuing original and innova-
tive projects can lead to different verdicts than profes-
sional norms that aim at realistic goals and clear
deliverables. The Code of Conduct from Canada, for in-
stance, says that researchers should be innovative and
that managed risk-taking should be encouraged (p. 4).
At the same time, it says that realistic goals should be
set and that there should be clearly defined deliverables
(p. 4). As in the previous example, the norms themselves
employ guarded language and contain qualifiers, but it
should be clear that the values underlying them (innova-
tiveness and something like effectiveness and efficiency)
pull in different directions. This is another instance of
incommensurability: how does the value of adding in-
novative true beliefs compare to that of running a re-
search project efficiently and effectively? It seems there
is no more general value under which both of these
could be subsumed to determine their comparative im-
portance. Hence, it is not clear that there is a uniquely
correct way to balance the two: it all depends on how
much value one attaches to original and groundbreaking
research versus realistic and manageable research. This
is another case of incommensurability.13Note that saying that two values are incommensurable does not
mean that we cannot compare any norms that derive from them. In
the present case, for instance, it is clear that we can compare the
amount of disclosure prompted by a pure commitment to the
epistemic value of openness with that prompted by pure commitment
to honoring one’s contractual obligations. The same is true for any
pair of incommensurable values: once we think about more concrete
norms and behaviors that would promote these values, we will always
be able to find some aspects in which these behaviors can be
compared. But that does not mean we have found a fully general way
of comparing the two values as such, which would allow us to resolve
any conflict between them.Incommensurability between norms means that there
is irreducible axiological pluralism in codes of conduct.
Why does this matter? For one thing, because incom-
mensurability makes it impossible to compare the ser-
iousness of integrity violations in a transparent
systematic fashion and this, in turn, means that it is diffi-
cult to justify sanctions and their severity systematically
and transparently. To illustrate, imagine an institutional
research integrity committee that has to respond to two
misconduct cases. In one case, a researcher changed the
results under pressure from a sponsor and failed to dis-
close this. This clashes with epistemic norms about
transparency and impartiality. In another case, a princi-
pal investigator repeatedly neglected her team on a
major research project, which clashes with moral and
professional norms about fair treatment of fellow re-
searchers. Supposing the norms involved are indeed in-
commensurable, the committee has no way of
comparing the severity of these two cases directly, and
hence, it is very hard to say whether the same or differ-
ent sanctions are justified in these two cases.
Note, however, that this is not to say that incommen-
surability between norms always makes justified deci-
sions about what to do impossible. First, not all
incommensurability leads to conflict. In contrast with
the examples above, many incommensurable norms do
not pull in different directions. For example, one can
easily grant a Ph.D. student one is supervising author-
ship (thereby meeting a moral and professional norm)
and report only correctly rounded p values in various
studies (thereby meeting an epistemic norm). There is
no conflict and no pressure to choose between the two,
and this seems to apply to the majority of norms in most
situations: they do not lead to incompatible prescriptions
for how to act. Second, for particular conflicts between
incommensurable norms, there might be good reasons
for resolving them in a certain way even if there is no
general way to compare these norms and the values
underlying them. Suppose, for instance, that certain
groups in society might be at a significant disadvantage.
If it is foreseeable that a novel research project would
negatively affect the wellbeing of these groups even fur-
ther, this might be a good reason to give priority to a
moral responsibility norm over an epistemic norm and
thus to refrain from pursuing this project (see [29], pp.
93–108 for discussion). Such considerations, however,
are heavily context-dependent and, therefore, cannot be
captured in general rules as to how to weigh various in-
commensurable norms.
Axiological pluralism 2: Conflicting norms from
the same category
Let us now turn to conflicting norms within one cat-
egory. Norms within a single category may or may not
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tainly looks like there are different norms even within
one category, which can pull in different directions and
lead to conflicting prescriptions for how to act. This pre-
sents another dimension of axiological pluralism. For the
sake of brevity, we will only give examples of conflicting
epistemic and moral norms.Conflicting epistemic norms
There are at least two core epistemic values that give
rise to different and potentially conflicting epistemic
norms. On the one hand, it is an epistemic value to
maximize true belief. On the other hand, there is the
epistemic value of minimizing false belief. These two
values have been recognized since William James’ for-
mulation of them.15
The following epistemic norms that we find in
various codes arguably aim at maximization of true
beliefs:
 The researcher must seek to offer an original and
relevant contribution to advance science (Directives
from Brazil, p. 21).
 Information will be presented truthfully and
accurately in proposing, conducting, and reporting
on research, and any claims made will be justifiable
and evidence-based (Australian Code, p. 2).
We also find norms that seem primarily relevant to
the avoidance of false belief:
 Authors and publishers consider negative results to
be as valid as positive findings for publication and
dissemination (ALLEA, p. 7);
 Research will be underpinned by attention to detail
and robust methodology, avoiding or acknowledging
biases (Australian Code, p. 2).
As in the previous section, we see that the examples of
norms given here do not exemplify the two core epi-
stemic values of maximizing true belief and minimizing
false belief in their pure form. This is only to be ex-
pected, since we always have to balance two values, both
in everyday life and in scientific practice. Even so, there
is a case to be made that striving for novelty and14There are long-standing debates about this in both ethics and epis-
temology. Some consequentialists in ethics, for example, maintain that
only pleasure is valuable (classically [6] [1789]), while others recognize
multiple values, some of which are thought incommensurable [11]. In
epistemology, some think truth is the only value [13], while others
plump for value pluralism [2, 16].
15See [27], p. 24. Many philosophers working in epistemology have
accepted this as the twofold epistemic aim, e.g., [18], p. 317; [38], p.
55; [39].originality mostly promotes the acquisition of true be-
liefs, whereas reporting negative results and acknowledg-
ing potential biases serves to avoid mistakes and so to
minimize false beliefs.
To see that norms deriving from these two values
can conflict, consider (unrealistically) that one maxi-
mizes true belief by simply believing everything, while
minimizing false beliefs is accomplished by believing
nothing. A more realistic conflict occurs, for instance,
when the norm of presenting original and creative re-
search clashes with the norm of not presenting (or
avoiding) research that is biased. Imagine that one
has proposed a new hypothesis and decides to put it
to the test. One uses a new machine in the lab, but
in the course of conducting the relevant experiments
and measurements, the machine appears to suffer
from minor malfunction. Upon technical inspection,
however, it looks fine. The results are novel and ori-
ginal, but one has reason to think that they may be
the product of one’s inexperience, programming er-
rors, or some other unknown issue with the machine.
In such a case, either one should present that re-
search and be explicit about one’s suspicions about
the machine’s malfunctioning, or one should refrain
from publishing the study—at least for the time be-
ing, until one has more confidence in the results—
even though it is novel and original. Inevitably, there
will be scenarios in which norms regarding novelty
and creativity favor publication and norms about
carefulness count against (immediate) publication.
This shows that, even within the category of epistemic
norms, we find norms promoting different epistemic
values relevant to research integrity. Again, this need not
always cause problems, but researchers should be aware
that there will be situations in which they have to bal-
ance various norms.
Conflicting moral norms
The moral realm, too, has potentially conflicting norms.
An obvious example is the conflict between norms of
openness on the one hand and norms of privacy and
ownership on the other. In codes of conduct, we find a
variety of epistemic, but also moral norms that encour-
age openness, transparency, and communication:
 Research methodology, research findings and
knowledge will be shared and communicated openly
(Australian Code, p. 2);
 Disclose and manage actual, potential, or perceived
conflicts of interest (Australian Code, p. 4).
On the other hand, though, we find norms that advo-
cate privacy, and, thus, not being open, transparent, or
communicative about certain facts or data. For example:
16Note that although Bouter et al. use this measure to evaluate the
seriousness of a set of questionable research practices, it could be
generalized to include evaluations of desirable research behavior. We
could also estimate the truth and trust impact of following norms,
engaging in good practices, etc.
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with other researchers or as a member of a team,
the researcher must maintain the confidentiality of
all data, information, procedures, and partial results
until the final results of the study are published,
unless all collaborators and all team coordinators
grant permission to disclose such information
(Directives from Brazil, p. 22);
 The provisions for protecting the confidentiality of
personal data, and respecting the privacy of subjects,
including the precautions that are in place to
prevent disclosure of the results of a subject’s
genetic tests to immediate family relatives without
the consent of the subject (Directives from
Zimbabwe, p. 13).
From the point of view of openness and transparency,
it would be best to reveal all data, so that everyone has
access to it. From the point of view of privacy, though, it
is sometimes best not to reveal all data.
Overcoming pluralism?
At this point, one might wonder if the kinds of pluralism
we have identified can be overcome. In other words, can
we reduce certain norms to others (and mutatis mutan-
dis the same for values and virtues)? A prior question,
however, is why we would even want to overcome plur-
alism. What is wrong with it? After all, the normative
scientific landscape that includes different kinds of
values, norms, and virtues might simply be (highly) com-
plex. We agree, and we will end up arguing that plural-
ism is inevitable. But that does not mean it is not useful
to explore attempts to overcome pluralism. In general,
simplicity is an important desideratum for scientific and
philosophical theories, so it is worth exploring how
much of it can be had here. Simplicity is also desirable
for practical reasons: if we could overcome pluralism, it
would be easier to rank various kinds of integrity
breaches and to assign proper sanctions. Moreover, see-
ing how attempts to overcome pluralism fail can be in-
structive in appreciating the kind of pluralism we are
dealing with even better.
One way to overcome plurality would be to develop an
ordering of different sorts of norm violations based on a
common measure for their seriousness. Below, we spell
out and assess three attempts that even though they are
meaningful and valuable for other purposes, do not solve
the challenge of pluralism.
1. Determining the prevalence or preventability of
different kinds of integrity breaches will not do the
job. For by themselves, these measures tell us
nothing about the absolute or relative seriousness of
integrity breaches. Of course, if we were to have ameasure of the seriousness of norm violations,
information about their prevalence and
preventability would be crucial for deciding what
sorts of interventions for improving research
integrity would be most promising, but that is a
further issue beyond the scope of the present paper.
2. Factors such as whether a norm was violated
intentionally or not and whether it was violated by
an experienced scientist or by a freshly minted
Ph.D. also do not provide a framework for
comparing different kinds of norm violations. It is
true that, other things being equal, the same
violation done intentionally is more blameworthy
than when done unintentionally. And it is true that
the same violation is more blameworthy when done
by an experienced researcher who should have
known better, than when it is done by a fresh Ph.D.
But, again, that implies nothing about how we
should weigh the relative seriousness of, say, failing
to grant authorship to a junior colleague compared
to HARKing [28].
3. A more promising approach is that developed in
Bouter et al. [8]. They rank about 60 questionable
research practices in terms of what they label their
“importance.” This is defined as frequency
multiplied by impact, where impact is divided into
two aspects: impact on trust in science and impact
on scientific truth-finding. Both frequency and the
two forms of impact are measured by expert esti-
mates: scientists assigning values on a 5-point
scale.16
This is indeed a step in the right direction if we are
looking to make a systematic comparison and evaluation
of various breaches of integrity. But there are at least
three reasons why this approach does not overcome the
forms of pluralism we identified above. (Note that this is
not supposed to be a criticism of Bouter et al., for they
never intended to use their measure to overcome
pluralism.)
First, by focusing exclusively on trust impact and truth
impact, the measure simply assumes a specific and con-
tested normative moral theory, namely a form of conse-
quentialism according to which only the consequences
for trust and truth-finding determine the rightness or
wrongness of academic (mis)behavior. This is a possible
view, but it needs to be defended rather than assumed.
To mention just two worries, some breaches of integrity
may have no or only neglible impact on trust in science
17See Baehr [4] for a discussion of the intellectual virtue of open-
mindedness along these lines.
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mals or very liberal granting of authorships—but we
may nonetheless have good reason to discourage them.
Moreover, two norm violations may have identical im-
pact on trust and truth-finding, but we may have other
grounds for deeming one more serious than another.
One could, for instance, involve the breaking of a prom-
ise at significant professional cost to a junior colleague
whereas the other is merely due to inattentiveness.
Second, a 5-point scale for trust and truth-finding im-
pact is too crude a measure and obscures potential value
conflicts from view. Suppose someone estimates that a
certain breach of integrity has a great impact (say 5) on
truth-finding. In light of our earlier discussion of the
twin epistemic goal of maximizing true belief and min-
imizing false belief, it is unclear what this estimate
means. That this breach causes scientists to avoid fewer
false beliefs, to acquire less true beliefs, or both? Or, al-
ternatively, that it causes scientists to do these things
faster or slower? Depending on how one weighs these
twin goals, one may be more serious than the other.
Similar concerns arise for impact on trust: what does it
mean when this is high? That science can be trusted less
to discover truths, to treat scientists well, to take rele-
vant social concerns into account, something else, all of
these things?
Third, the fact that impact is measured by expert esti-
mates is unsatisfactory. Scientists may not always have a
clear view on how serious various breaches of integrity
are. After all, estimating this requires, in addition to fa-
miliarity with the practice of science, normative analysis.
This is not something scientists are especially equipped
for. But even if we assume that scientists’ expert esti-
mates can be trusted, the fact that they remain black
boxes is unsatisfactory. As we argued above, there is
strong reason to think that there are conflicting and
sometimes incommensurable values underlying codes of
conduct. Because of this, we should not rely blindly on
(alleged) expert estimates. What we need is an explicit,
systematic, and transparent account of how to weigh
and compare the relevant norms, values, and virtues—
or, if that is impossible in full generality, at least indica-
tions of how we can go about resolving cases of conflict-
ing and incommensurable norms.
Hence, our conclusion stands: behind codes of con-
duct is an irreducible plurality of values that lead to dif-
ferent categories and kinds of norms. This realization
should prompt intellectual humility in code drafters and
code users. Because research integrity involves an irredu-
cible plurality of sometimes incommensurable and con-
flicting norms of different kinds, one should assume that
there will be multiple and equally reasonable ways of
dealing with conflicts. Hence, it is important to listen to
others, to transcend one’s default viewpoint in order toconsider the merits of other points of view.17 Recently
released codes attempt to guide judgments of which
norms are more important by providing lists of assess-
ment criteria when inspecting integrity breaches (see
Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity,
2018, p. 24 or Guide to Managing and Investigating Po-
tential Breaches of the Australian Code for the Respon-
sible Conduct of Research, 2018). Such criteria are
helpful, but they do not eliminate value pluralism. Ra-
ther, they identify considerations that should be factored
into argumentations for why certain norms, values, or
virtues are more important in a particular case than
others. Justifying such argumentations requires an intel-
lectually humble attitude, which is sensitive to both the
plurality of norms, values, and virtues that constitute re-
search integrity and to contextually relevant features of
particular cases.Conclusions
We have shown the need for philosophical (namely,
metaphysical and axiological) analysis of how various
norms of research integrity and their breaches relate to
each other. We have also provided some key ingredients
for an axiological framework by arguing that (1) we
ought to distinguish between norms, values, and virtues;
(2) there are five relevant categories of norms: epistemic,
moral, professional, social, and legal; (3) in some cases,
norms from various categories and norms within the
same category can conflict or be incommensurable; and
(4) there is no common measure available to systematic-
ally compare different forms of research misconduct.
We would like to close with six recommendations for
scholars working on research integrity:
1. In discussing issues in research integrity and in
composing codes, we should distinguish explicitly
between values, virtues, and norms, and account for
how they take them to relate to each other.
2. In formulating norms, we should explicate what
sort of norms we have in mind: epistemic, moral,
professional, social, legal, or combinations thereof.
3. We should be aware that norms can be
incommensurable with each other or conflict with
each other in specific situations.
4. We should consider that even within the same
category of norms, incommensurability or conflict
is possible because different kinds of values underlie
these norms.
5. In codes of research integrity, guidance should be
given about what to do when norms are
incommensurable or conflict with each other.
Peels et al. Research Integrity and Peer Review            (2019) 4:18 Page 12 of 136. Scientists, scholars, and other code writers and
code users should be intellectually humble in
navigating conflicting norms and provide careful,
context-sensitive reasons for the choice they make,
as these choices may not be perfectly justified and
sometimes not even perfectly justifiable.
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